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Cynic Cosmopolitanism  
    
Abstract: Recently, British Prime Minister Theresa May made a bold anti-cosmopolitan claim: ‘If you believe you are 
a citizen of the world, you are a citizen of nowhere. You don't understand what citizenship means.’ Given that many 
have never found nationalism particularly appealing, some have been moved to become citizens of the world after 
hearing these lines. But how is one to become a cosmopolitan? The answer is found in the history of philosophy. 
Cosmopolitanism has taken many forms. There are moral, political, legal, economic, and cultural cosmopolitanisms. 
A form that has not received much attention is therapeutic cosmopolitanism. The focus of this form is on how being 
a world-citizen entails certain health benefits. I argue therapeutic cosmopolitanism is both the original and best way 
of being a world-citizen. To do so, I summarize the present taxonomy of cosmopolitanisms and show how therapeutic 
cosmopolitanism contrasts with these options. I use classical Cynicism as the primary example of therapeutic 
cosmopolitanism. Instead of the universalist humanism and supranational communitarianism that characterizes 
cosmopolitan options, Cynic cosmopolitanism employs extreme naturalism. I show how being a Cynic cosmopolitan 
is the preferable way of rejecting nationalists of all stripes. 
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1. Cosmopolitanisms 
 
Definitions of cosmopolitanism usually involve some combination of universalism, humanism, and 
communitarianism. Universalism, in this context, is the sense that something is applicable to all humans. Humanism 
is the view that humans contain special and intrinsic value. Communitarianism is the idea that the special and intrinsic 
value of humans is best expressed in terms of their membership of some community. In a definition of 
cosmopolitanism, that community is all humans. Most definitions emphasize certain features all humans are thought 
to share, with such features being the basis for the recognition of membership in a universal community. For example, 
Pauline Kleingeld and Eric Brown define cosmopolitanism as the view that ‘all human beings, regardless of their 
political affiliation, are (or can and should be) citizens in a single community’ (2014). Elsewhere, Kleingeld says 
cosmopolitanism is the idea that ‘all human beings share certain essential features that unite or should unite them in a 
global order that transcends national borders and warrants their designation as ‘citizens of the world’’ (Kleingeld 
1999: 505). What distinguishes different forms of cosmopolitanism is the common feature human beings are thought 
to share and the kind of community they form on the basis of that common feature. Borrowing a distinction from 
Jonathan Schaffer’s discussion of different types of metaphysical monism (2016), we can say the common human 
feature is the target of a cosmopolitanism, while the community formed on the basis of that feature is the unit with 
which the target is counted. There is thus a cosmopolitanism relative to a target and a unit, where cosmopolitanism 
for target t counted by unit u is the view that t counted by u is a universal human community. The different kinds of 
cosmopolitanism amount to different kinds of universal human communities. These different communities are not 
necessarily mutually exclusive. As we will see, one kind of cosmopolitanism can include elements of other kinds. 
Some kinds of cosmopolitanism require aspects of others in order to complete their view of what constitutes a universal 
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human community. Many cosmopolitanisms overlap. We will go through the different kinds of cosmopolitanism in 
order to see how therapeutic, and then Cynic, cosmopolitanism constitutes a unique and, I will argue, superior form 
of the view.  
 The predominant form of cosmopolitanism is moral cosmopolitanism. Historically, moral cosmopolitanism 
is most clearly found in the works of the Stoics and Kant. With the Stoics, the essential trait of humans that makes 
them members of a universal community is their capacity for reason. Human reason is the portion found in the human 
soul of a universal divine reason the Stoics regarded as God, the whole world or cosmos, and its naturally lawful order 
(Diogenes Laertius [DL] 7.137; Hicks 1925: 241). Human reason is the moral capacity to understand what one ought 
to do, how one should live, and what is owed to others. Virtue is reason activated, the identification of one’s soul with 
the divine law that permeates the cosmos. It is the act of making moral choices that correspond to this natural law. It 
tells us to treat all humans as equally capable of reasoning and virtue, as equally worthy of dignity and respect. 
According to Cicero, ‘we are all constrained by one and the same law of nature, and if this is true, then we are certainly 
forbidden by the law of nature from acting violently against another person’ (Cicero, De Officis 3.27; Griffith and 
Atkins 1996: 110). No distinction of locale, class, tribe, or nation is morally significant here. What matters is fellow 
humanity defined as moral, rational, lawful, and free. By being capable of reason and virtue—of following the divine, 
natural law—and thus sharing equal moral worth, humans are a part of a universal community, citizens of a pantheist 
city of God. Humans are all fellow citizens of a divine, moral cosmopolis. Plutarch says, ‘we should regard all human 
beings as our fellow demesmen and fellow citizens, and there should be one way of life and one order’ (Plutarch, De 
Alex Fort. 329a-b (LS 67A); Long and Sedley 1987: 429). Marcus Aurelius summarized the Stoic version of moral 
cosmopolitanism nicely: 
If we have intelligence in common, so we have reason which makes us reasoning beings, and that practical 
reason which orders what we must or must not do; then the law too is common to us and, if so, we are citizens; 
if so, we share a common government; if so, the universe is, as it were, a city—for what other common 
government could one say is shared by all mankind? From this, the common city, we derive our intelligence, 
our reason and our law—from what else? (Marcus Aurelius Med iv.4; Grube 1983: 26-7) 
 
Kant was deeply influenced by the Stoics (Nussbaum 1997). He also employed the idea of a communal 
cosmopolis composed of all free and equal rational humans obeying the natural moral law of treating everyone with 
dignity and respect. All humans are thought to be “citizens of a supersensible world,” members of a universal moral 
community (Kant 2006: 74). Regardless of their actual spatio-temporal locations or national identifications, humans 
are members of one unit insofar as they all have an obligation to obey a shared natural moral law based on reason. 
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Although he at times tried to resist it, Kant shared with the Stoics their belief in a moral teleology inherent to nature 
that guides humans towards the providence of a moral cosmopolis (Kant 2006: 87). It seems that for the Stoics and 
Kant, nature takes sides and wants us to be rational free agents that would serve as good world-citizens. While many 
moral cosmopolitans today try to downplay the natural moral teleology and providentialism their view presupposes, 
since it appears to fly entirely in the face of what science tells us about the world, it does not seem possible to be a 
moral cosmopolitanism without believing humanity’s rational free agency is or entails an objective, natural moral 
facticity of some sort. In order to avoid this metaethical moral naturalist conclusion, however, contemporary moral 
cosmopolitans, and political philosophers more generally, often try to use a different metaethical view, moral 
constructivism, as the foundation for their moral views.  
Constructivism says moral facts or truths are reducible to the preferences and decisions of rational agents 
(Bagnoli 2012). The problem is that constructivism has been noted to need to fall back into moral naturalism in order 
to avoid being beset by a Euthyphro-style dilemma where moral truths are either the arbitrary result of some agent’s 
preferences or reducible to some external, objective standard. Either the moral law is moral because a rational agent 
has preferred it, in which case it is roughly arbitrary, or it is moral because it refers to some objective, natural fact of 
the matter, which makes the rational agent secondary. At least tacitly, moral cosmopolitanism favors the latter option, 
as it seems to be less damaging to submit to moral naturalism than moral voluntarism, with its tendencies toward brute 
moral relativism and subjectivism. For moral cosmopolitans, that external, objective standard is nature’s intrinsic 
morality as expressed by the teleological development of human reason. Obviously, moral and political philosophers 
try to avoid having to admit this, again because of its lacking any empirical evidence, so they propose ignoring the 
issue altogether or construing it in such a way they feel they do not need to confess to being moral naturalists (Rawls 
1980; Hill 1989; O’Neill 1998; Korsgaard 2003). It is rather unlikely that they succeed in this. Again, it does not seem 
possible to be a moral cosmopolitan without being a moral naturalist. Whether one could be a moral naturalist without 
believing in an inherent moral teleology basic to nature seems equally unlikely, for what then would explain the 
existence of objective moral facts? Needing to accept moral teleology seems to make moral naturalism unacceptable 
(Joyce 2006: 179-219), and if moral naturalism fails because it requires moral teleology, then it appears moral 
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cosmopolitanism would thus also fail. Or, at least, as we will see, this is what is presupposed in Cynic 
cosmopolitanism, which is why it is a therapeutic and not necessarily or primarily a moral cosmopolitanism.1   
Another aspect of contemporary moral cosmopolitanism that involves an attempt to appear less rooted in the 
original Stoic view is an emphasis on individuality over community. This is not to say contemporary cosmopolitans 
do not claim we owe allegiance to “the worldwide community of human beings” (Nussbaum 1994: 343). Supranational 
communitarianism is still relevant, but universalist humanism is now of primary concern. Contemporary moral 
cosmopolitans shift focus from the intrinsic natural value of the cosmic community itself, the moral cosmopolis, to 
that of the human persons of which it is composed. Gillian Brock writes, ‘The core idea with moral cosmopolitanism 
is that every person has global stature as the ultimate unit of moral concern and is therefore entitled to equal 
consideration no matter what her citizenship or nationality status’ (Brock 2013: 690). Thomas Pogge has similarly 
provided three conditions for contemporary moral cosmopolitanism: 
Three elements are shared by all cosmopolitan positions. First, individualism: the ultimate units of concern 
are human beings, or persons—rather than, say, family lines, tribes, ethnic, cultural, or religious communities, 
nations, or states. The latter may be units of concern only indirectly, in virtue of their individual members or 
citizens. Second, universality: that status of ultimate unit of concern attaches to every living human being 
equally—not merely to some sub-set, such as men, aristocrats, Aryans, whites, or Muslims. Third, generality: 
this special status has global force. Persons are ultimate units of concern for everyone—not only for their 
compatriots, fellow religionists, or such like. (Pogge 1992: 48) 
 
So, with individualism, universalism, and generalism, contemporary moral cosmopolitanism aims to slightly alter the 
earlier Stoic and Kantian views by focusing less on an ontologically distinct worldwide human community that was 
the bearer of ultimate moral concern and more on the individual humans who, as individuals, are of the units of 
ultimate moral concern.  
 Moving on, political cosmopolitanism has often gone hand in hand with moral cosmopolitanism. In order to 
make world-citizenship less a moral ideal and more a reality, some cosmopolitans have proposed the formation of an 
actual world government in order to codify and enforce moral cosmopolitanism. Some view this as a need for a 
centralized world-state, while others more as a need for an international federalism where many of the functions of 
the nation-state are transferred to a supranational body so that moral cosmopolitanism is gradually institutionalized. 
While moral cosmopolitanism does not require political cosmopolitanism in order to remain a live option, it seems 
                                                        
1 Obviously, I am making rather quick work here of deep and intractable metaethical disagreements concerning the 
intricacies of moral constructivism and moral naturalism. I do not expect to have convinced constructivists or 
naturalists of the falsity of their view in a couple of paragraphs. What I am trying to do is to show that, when we get 
to it, Cynic cosmopolitanism will not have the metaethical problems I think moral cosmopolitan views have.  
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gradual institutionalization is certainly preferable. What has vexed political cosmopolitanism is deciding just how 
much sovereignty a world-state should have. Historically, Kant is thought to have favored a league of states without 
much coercive power, while other German Idealists and Romantics like Fichte and Schlegel appeared to favor a league 
with the ability to enforce federal laws, or, in Schlegel’s case, the emergence a global republic with some democratic 
elements (Kleingeld 1999: 510). Today, there are many heirs to Kant’s vision, while others have pitched ‘cosmopolitan 
democracy’ or ‘republican cosmopolitanism’ as the chief means by which to make moral cosmopolitanism politically 
real. It is hard to tell if any contemporary prominent cosmopolitans support perhaps the most extreme political 
cosmopolitanism, that of the Prussian noble and French revolutionary Anacharsis Cloots, who proposed doing away 
with all nation-states entirely in favor of a single world-state (Cloots 1800). Interestingly, Alexander Wendt, a 
contemporary International Relations theorist, applies the naturalist teleology of moral cosmopolitanism to the logic 
of anarchy that pertains between nation-states to argue that a world-state is simply inevitable (Wendt 2003).  
 What distinguishes moral from political cosmopolitanism is that what constitutes membership of the 
universal human community in the case of the former is the moral agency of all humans, while in that of the latter it 
is the potential literal citizenship of all humans in a global political entity. A third kind of cosmopolitanism, implied 
by political cosmopolitanism, is a legal one. Legal cosmopolitanism says all humans have basic rights to be treated in 
certain ways by foreign nation-states. A universal human community emerges when it is recognized as legally 
necessary to respect the basic rights of all foreigners, which all humans are with respect to other nation-states. In Kant, 
this takes the form of a right to hospitality (Kant 2006: 82). Fichte took legal cosmopolitanism further by treating the 
right to hospitality as the most basic human right, the right that allows one to have any other rights. This meant, for 
Fichte, that all humans are, in a sense, originally strangers to each other and thus have the right to enter into political 
and legal relationships and so be treated without sanctioned hostility (Kleingeld 1999: 515). All humans thus form a 
universal legal community as bearers of the most basic of legal requirements: to be treated with the requisite equal 
respect and dignity of human persons. This kind of cosmopolitanism is again not so much a departure from moral 
cosmopolitanism, but a different perspective on it. Morally, all humans are rational free agents imbued by nature with 
a capacity to fulfill their providential purpose. Politically, all humans are potential world-citizens. Legally, all humans 
are bearers of the most basic right to hospitality. Moral cosmopolitanism can be given political standing by recognizing 
all humans as actual citizens of a nascent or federating world-state, but it can also be given legal standing by 
recognizing all humans as equal bearers of the fundamental right to hospitality, which is the foundation of the law and 
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what is codified in any constitution or legal enactment. A moral, political, and legal cosmopolis will thus most likely 
overlap.  
 Other kinds of cosmopolitanism do not necessarily involve the strong moral emphasis on the intrinsic value 
of universal humanity, whether taken communally or individually. Rather, they focus on other features of human 
interaction that, if championed and emboldened, could foster the emergence of a different kind of supranational 
community. For example, there is historical evidence for a kind of economic cosmopolitanism. On the one hand, 
contemporary moral cosmopolitans regard as an essential step towards the appreciation of the intrinsic worth of all 
persons the global redistribution of economic wealth so to eliminate the unjust consequences of poverty. We can say 
this is a kind of economic cosmopolitanism. On the other hand, there is another kind of economic cosmopolitanism 
that has its roots in classical liberal figures like Adam Smith and Dietrich Hegewisch (Kleingeld 1999:518). This kind 
of economic cosmopolitanism is more market oriented. Its aim is to establish a global community of producers and 
consumers unencumbered by mercantilist tactics like trade restrictions, tariffs, and overall excessive regulation and 
political interference. The idea is that if humans are regarded purely as economic actors and not citizens of particular 
nation-states, then the probable rapid economic growth and integration resulting from the lifting of trade restrictions 
would lead to a kind of mass prosperity that would enable all to flourish and actualize their potential. The economic 
cosmopolis would be a single global free trade zone. All humans would be the citizens of a global marketplace. As 
the role of states would be reduced, human freedom would be maximized and world peace would break out. Now, it 
is hard to tell whether this kind of market-orientated economic cosmopolitanism would be reconcilable with moral, 
political, or legal cosmopolitanism. Most likely, it would not be, at least not from the perspective of the previous views 
canvassed. It is not easy to imagine the proponents of the other cosmopolitanisms finding the more libertarian and 
almost anarchic aspects of market cosmopolitanism to be all that conducive to their preferred visions of a universal 
human community. The claim would be that market cosmopolitanism would inevitably lead to too much inequality 
and suffering. Of course, the market cosmopolitan would reply that only its approach would supply the sufficient 
amount of wealth needed to make equality all that worthwhile.  
 A final kind of cosmopolitanism can be broadly understood in more cultural terms. Some historical figures 
like Georg Foster have viewed humans as fundamentally alike in terms of their capacity for particular cultural practices 
like art or religion (Kleingeld 1999: 515). Cultural cosmopolitans view humans as basically equal in terms of their 
creative powers. All humans are cultured beings, determined by universal practices that at bottom involve the capacity 
 7 
for narrative self-identification and expression. While aiming to avoid relativism, cultural cosmopolitanism claims all 
humans are part of single global community composed of a plethora of different cultures that each in their own way 
shows humans to be creatures driven by imagination, feeling, and desire. Cultural cosmopolitanism is thus a way to 
balance the starkly rationalist tendencies of the other cosmopolitanisms. The cultural cosmopolis is a global 
community composed of a diverse set of equally expressive creators. These creators, however, are more the cultures 
themselves than the individuals that exemplify them. Therefore, it is a kind of cosmopolitanism that is less 
individualistic than contemporary moral cosmopolitanism. On the other hand, on the face of it, it does not seem cultural 
cosmopolitanism is all that irreconcilable with the other kinds of cosmopolitanism. What would be of utmost concern 
for cultural cosmopolitans is the preservation of the diversity of cultural forms, whether in the form of languages, 
ritual practices, or art-forms. It seems the goals of moral, political, legal and a distributivist kind of economic 
cosmopolitanism could be achieved while preserving cultural diversity. Universal humanity’s capacity for cultural 
creation establishes a supranational community composed of diverse units of feeling and meaning. Such a community 
could overlap with moral, political, legal, and economic ones.  
2. Therapeutic Cosmopolitanism  
Another kind of cosmopolitanism that has received less attention is therapeutic cosmopolitanism. Moral 
cosmopolitanism in its more Stoic form has a strongly therapeutic element. This is because Stoic philosophy in general 
is considered to be a kind of cognitive behavioral therapy. To take a step back, since its beginning, philosophy itself 
has been concerned with modifying our beliefs, desires, and emotions in order to remedy the common human 
propensity for delusion, confusion, sadness, anxiety, anger, lust, and fear. Ancient philosophers sought to remedy this 
propensity. Philosophy was regarded as a kind of cure whose purpose was to ameliorate psychological suffering and 
encourage flourishing or happiness (eudaimonia). Philosophy was an art of life dedicated to curing diseases of the 
soul.   There have been some recent attempts to return to the view of philosophy as therapy (Nussbaum 1994; Sorabji 
2000; Carlisle and Ganari 2010; Fischer 2011; Banacki 2014). These recent discussions focus on the analogy of 
philosophy to medicine found in many ancient texts.  Epicurus famously wrote, ‘Empty is that philosopher’s argument 
by which no human suffering is therapeutically treated. For just as there is no use in a medical art that does not cast 
out the sickness of bodies, so too there is no use in philosophy, unless it casts out the suffering of the soul’ (Porphyry, 
To Marcella 31; Long and Sedley 1987: 155). The Greek Stoic Chrysippus is reported to have said, ‘It is not true that 
there exists an art called medicine, concerned with the diseased body, but no corresponding art concerned with the 
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diseased soul. Nor is it true that the latter is inferior to the former, in its theoretical grasp and therapeutic treatment of 
individual cases’ (Galen, On the Doctrines of Hippocrates and Plato 5.2.2; Nussbaum 1994: 13-14). Sextus Empiricus 
called the Skeptics ‘philanthropic’ and said they ‘wish to cure by argument, as far as they can, the conceit and rashness 
of the Dogmatists.’ They would do so by administering arguments differing in degrees of strength just like doctors 
administering remedies differing in potency (Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Scepticism 3.280; Annas and Barnes 2000: 
216). Not only did the Hellenistic schools have a therapeutic focus and regard philosophy as a kind of medicine, we 
can find traces of the same view in some of the Presocratics like Empedocles and Democritus, in tragedians and poets 
like Aeschylus and Pindar, and even in Homer (Nussbaum 1994: 49). 
Nussbaum further elaborates on the medical analogy by discussing three key aspects of philosophy as 
therapy. First, there must be a way for philosophy to diagnose the source and nature of the disease preventing human 
flourishing. Second, philosophy must have some notion of health so it can contrast the diseased state with a prospective 
healthy one. And third, philosophy must have a methodological conception of itself in terms of its ability to diagnose 
illnesses in accordance with its notion of health and then remedy them through argument and discursive interaction 
(Nussbaum 1994: 29). More recently, Konrad Banicki has argued similarly there are seven elements that constitute a 
therapeutic model of philosophy. There needs to be a disease or illness and its symptoms, an ideal of health, a process 
of treatment, a therapeutic theory, a physician, a patient, and a physician-patient relationship. (Banicki 2014, pp. 20-
21) Banicki also notes how it is specific to philosophy that it can be a kind of self-therapy wherein the physician and 
patient are the same person. This point echoes Cicero’s defense of the medical analogy when he says that ‘philosophy 
[is] a medical art of the soul whose aid need not be sought, as in bodily diseases, from outside ourselves. We must 
endeavor with all our resources and all our strength to become capable of doctoring ourselves’ (Cicero, Tusculan 
Disputations 3.6; Nussbaum 1994: 14). Eugen Fischer (2011) also considers the possibility of philosophy serving a 
primarily therapeutic and self-therapeutic function. He claims philosophy-as-therapy can come in two forms: a 
philosophical therapy intending to use philosophy as a means for solving emotional and behavioral problems that 
emerge in everyday life prior to studying philosophy and a therapeutic philosophy intending to use philosophy as a 
means for solving emotional and behavioral problems that emerge from studying philosophy.  
To apply the therapeutic model to the concept of cosmopolitanism, we must discover which illness it is meant 
the cure. The illness seems to be any and all forms of nationalism, tribalism, parochialism, and general in-group bias 
and prejudice. Whatever separates humans, segregates them into distinct competing and conflicting groups, and bars 
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the formation of a supranational community based on universal humanity, is seen as the source of much human 
suffering. The various forms of group bias tend to lead to ideological delusion, myopic self-aggrandizement, isolation, 
racism, xenophobia, chauvinism, jingoism, and violence. These phenomena are clearly rooted in basic cognitive and 
emotional disturbances. Rarely is one displaying an in-group bias, no matter how the group is defined, without being 
driven mainly be fear, hatred, anger, and confusion. Cosmopolitanism, in each of its forms, is an attempt to remedy 
the common human tendency towards division into competing and conflicting groups. It is the therapeutic kind of 
cosmopolitanism that brings this point to the forefront. The emphasis on universal humanity here is meant to show 
that all divisions of people into separate groups represents a degradation and that the only real community worth 
championing is the one that sees all as members of a supranational community of patients who can be cured of their 
agitated and errant tribalism by switching perspective to a truly universal view of humans and their place in the cosmos. 
To summarize therapeutic cosmopolitanism by viewing it in terms of Banacki’s seven elements of the therapeutic 
model, we can say the disease it aims to cure is nationalism, tribalism, or any expression of parochialism or in-group 
bias; the ideal of health a persistent state of universal human community that results from overcoming such bias; the 
process of treatment the experience of learning to appreciate what all humans have in common; the therapeutic theory 
the approach that treats reflection in general as a means for overcoming in-group bias; and the physician-patient 
relationship the therapeutic way one treats one’s learning about in-group bias as a means for curing the diseased state 
of tribalist myopia. The Stoic tonic of an achieved virtuous rational free agency leading to a collective identification 
with an intrinsically valuable and naturally lawful cosmos is a perfect example of a kind of therapeutic 
cosmopolitanism. Stoic cosmopolitanism is meant to be a remedy for human irrationality and short-sightedness. It 
could be argued that each of the cosmopolitanisms surveyed could be regarded as providing therapeutic benefits as 
well. Whether as moral, political, legal, economic, or cultural, the result of a cosmopolitanism is often thought to be 
human flourishing. Therapeutic cosmopolitanism overlaps with the other kinds, yet remains a distinct kind insofar as 
its emphasis is on the specific mental health benefits that result from going cosmic. 
Of course, some will reply that group-based self-conceptions are essential to humanity’s success as a species 
and, as Carl Schmitt might argue (2007), the source of ultimate meaning and purpose in most humans’ lives. It seems 
from the perspective of evolution nothing produces more in-group cooperation and unification that competing with 
other groups (Choi and Bowles 2007; Bowles 2009; Turchin 2016). Some have argued that effectively sharing 
intentions within a group is what ultimately distinguishes humans from other animals (Tomasello et al 2005). Whether 
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as an empire, state, nation, region, city, deme, neighborhood, clan, tribe, family, or whatever group unit is thought to 
be the bearer of intrinsic value, without local group identity most people would experience even worse affects than 
the negative beliefs and emotions stemming from nationalism or tribalism (Haslam et al 2009). Thus, it would appear 
in-group bias is as much a cure for the human predicament as cosmopolitanism. In response, the therapeutic 
cosmopolitan, and probably any kind of cosmopolitan, would simply disagree on this point and claim that the benefits 
from in-group cooperation could be achieved without competition and conflict between groups, and certainly without 
the violence that usually occurs in the name of all kinds of patriotic fervor or group loyalty. The therapeutic 
cosmopolitan could argue that there is nothing about its approach that says people should not reap the obvious benefits 
from living in groups. Indeed, it might not even be possible to survive without such benefits. Rather, it is to realize 
that there are many more health benefits that go along with emptying oneself of the frenzy and turmoil that often 
attends strong beliefs and feelings about one’s group identity than clinging even harder to one’s group as if there was 
no shared or common humanity all members of all groups definitely enjoyed. Therapeutic cosmopolitanism does not 
want to deny that there are empirically obvious benefits to in-group cooperation, even that it may be the source of 
much human well-being, but it does think the negative psycho-social effects of excessive in-group identification need 
as much a remedy as the imagined anarchic case of living without a community at all.  
This debate really depends on how much therapeutic and moral cosmopolitanism overlap. If a therapeutic 
cosmopolitanism claims we should be cosmopolitan because it will produce greater health benefits for all of us, and 
if the reason they believe this is because they think the ultimate bearer of intrinsic value is either universal humanity 
regarded as a supranational community or each individual human being that goes to compose that community, then 
the nationalist will simply deny what the cosmopolitan asserts, placing the intrinsic value in the nation or tribe or 
whatever local group. We would thus be left with a standoff. The cosmopolitan and the nationalist just disagree about 
where intrinsic value lies. On the other hand, there is another way of being a therapeutic cosmopolitanism that does 
not bleed into moral cosmopolitanism of either a Stoic or Kantian sort, as it has no strong views about intrinsic value, 
and yet still rejects the tribalist claim that local group identity is of final importance. This type of cosmopolitanism 
remains therapeutic insofar as its main concern is to be free humans from the cognitive and emotional disturbance of 
being parochial, but it finds the best route to truly flourishing and living virtuously involves intensifying 
cosmopolitanism by taking it past universal humanism and supranational communitarianism. Instead, it offers 
identifying oneself with the entire natural world, with the cosmos itself, as a superior kind of cosmopolitan therapy. 
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This kind of therapeutic cosmopolitanism is in fact the first cosmopolitanism in the history of philosophy and it comes 
from the classical Cynics. Only with Cynic cosmopolitanism are all forms of parochialism and in-group bias overcome 
and the debate between morally-inclined therapeutic cosmopolitanism and nationalists dissolved. 
 3. Cynic Cosmopolitanism 
As we have seen, cosmopolitan sentiments were common in the ancient world. From the 5th century onward, 
identifying with no particular polis was regarded as a real option. In the nomos-physis debate among the Sophists, 
concerning whether social distinctions were more conventional or natural in origin, a figure like Antiphon could claim, 
‘By nature we are all similarly constituted in all respects, both barbarians and Greeks’ (Diels-Kranz [DK], fr 44; 
Gagarin 2002: 183). A group of philosophers who were firmly on the physis side of the debate were the Cynics. Less 
an actual school with a coherent doctrine, the Cynics were more a rag-tag group of philosophers who constituted a 
spectrum of degrees of intensity with respect to living in accordance with nature (zoon kata physin), with the most 
intense being the probable first Cynic, Diogenes of Sinope. Their name ‘cynic’ means ‘doglike,’ and the Cynics 
preferred a starkly animalistic and primitivist way of life, foregoing participation in the usual activities of civilization. 
They were extreme naturalists who regarded all forms of human pretense and convention as offenses against our true 
animal, natural selves. Their extreme naturalism meant they would not identify with any conventional group, including 
any particular polity.  It is thought that Diogenes was the first to use the term corresponding to our ‘cosmopolitan’ 
(kosmopolites): ‘When asked where he was from, he said, ‘I’m a citizen of the world’’ (DL 6.63; G355; Hicks 1925: 
65). In his satirical piece, Philosophers for Sale, Lucian has a potential buyer ask Diogenes ‘where do you come 
from?’ with Diogenes replying, ‘Everywhere. You are looking at a citizen of the world.’ The buyer then asks Diogenes 
about his main abilities. He replies, ‘I’m a liberator of humanity, a healer of human ills. In short I have set out to be a 
prophet of truth and plain speaking’ (Lucian, Philosophers for Sale 7-12; Hard 2012: 3-4).  
 To see how Cynic cosmopolitanism differs from Stoic and other forms of therapeutic cosmopolitanism, we 
should focus in turn on its negative and positive aspects (Moles 1996). Before doing so, I should emphasize here that 
I am engaging in a modern reconstruction of classical Cynicism and that I am eliding a long-standing debate in the 
reception of Cynicism regarding whether its kind of cosmopolitanism is only or primarily negative or positive. (Also, 
unfortunately, for linguistic reasons, I have been unable to properly utilize commentary on Cynicism coming for the 
European continent, in particular the work of Giannantoni, Goulet-Caze, and Helmer.)  Following John Moles, my 
claim is that the Cynic approach to cosmopolitanism has negative and positive aspects and that there is nothing 
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irreconcilable about these aspects. Moles writes that the Cynics’ rejection of nomos ‘does not make their 
cosmopolitanism purely negative, [but] it also has positive implications’ (Moles 1996: 109). And, when discussing 
the influence of Cynic cosmopolitanism upon Stoicism, Moles writes ‘the Cynics did not bequeth to the Stoics a purely 
negative concept to which the latter added a positive value: rather, Cynic cosmopolitanism already contained all the 
essential positive qualities’ (Moles 1996: 119). Negative and positive Cynic cosmopolitanism are parts of a single 
strategy, a strategy that may admittedly reflect more my attempted reconstruction of Cynicism than what is found in 
the primary and secondary sources. Yet, I do not think I am speculating beyond what the texts imply. As is often 
noted, it is difficult to tell how accurately one is representing the explicit views of the ancient Cynics considering our 
access to them is shrouded in obscurity. 
Cynic cosmopolitanism is both a denial of affiliation or identification with any particular place or people and 
an affirmation of and identification with the whole cosmos, nature itself. First, with negative Cynic cosmopolitanism, 
we can find elements of it in the earlier stages of Diogenes’ life. Diogenes was born in Sinope, a town on the south 
coast of the Black Sea. He was the son of a banker. Accounts differ, but Diogenes was forced into exile because he 
defaced and re-stamped the local currency. The story goes that Diogenes went to the Delphic or Delian oracle to ask 
if he should do this and ‘the god gave him his permission to alter the political currency’ (DL 6:20-1; G2; Hicks 1925: 
25). While he listened to the oracle, he did not quite understand its meaning until after, exiled and stateless, he realized 
it meant he was to deface not literal currency, but the currency of norms, values, and artificial distinctions that 
characterize human social life. ‘Deface the currency’ is the Cynic slogan announcing the intention to annihilate what 
renders humans local, parochial, and tribal. Nomoi are the obstacles to true joy. What keeps people artificially divided 
from nature is to be overcome. In its more specific political sense, ‘deface the currency’ meant the rejection of any 
sovereign authority, as the literal act of defacing the currency is often regarded as a lese-majeste offense.  
 Negative Cynic cosmopolitanism is the view that the cure to the human ills which stem from social life and 
consignment to group living is to identify oneself with no particular place or people, remain in a perpetual state of 
stateless exile, reject all social hierarchies by ‘ridiculing good birth and fame and all such distinctions as showy 
ornaments of vice’ (DL 6.72; Hicks 1925: 75),2 and pay no heed to any local authority no matter how big the locale. 
Diogenes, the story goes, famously told Alexander the Great to stand out of his sunlight when Alexander asked him 
                                                        
2 It should be noted that this doxographical section is often considered to be Stoicized and so might not be the best 
evidence for Cynicism.  
 13 
what he would like from him (DL 6.38; G33; Hicks 1925: 41). As Moles puts it, ‘the Cynic rejects the family and all 
distinctions based on sex, birth, rank, race, or education’ (Moles 1996: 116). Negative Cynic cosmopolitanism is to 
take Theresa May’s criticism that the cosmopolitan is a citizen of nowhere as a compliment. To be a citizen of nowhere 
is to be free from all the shackles and responsibilities of local citizenship. The Cynic understands exactly what humans 
mean by citizenship, contrary to May’s charge, but that is precisely why he rejects it, leaving him beholden to no one 
but himself and nature. The Cynic approach is utterly antinomian.  Diogenes’ rejection of nomos implies a rejection 
of the city, or society more generally, and civilization. In other words, for Diogenes, all three rise or fall together: 
‘Again, as to law: that it is impossible for society to exist without law; for without a city no benefit can be derived 
from that which is civilized. But the city is civilized, and there is no advantage in law without a city; therefore law is 
something civilized’ (DL 6.72; Hicks 1925: 73-4). Law, society, the city, and civilization are mutually entailed, and 
thus for Diogenes are equally rejected as unnatural obstacles to flourishing. Living stateless and regarding all poleis 
as against nature is the Cynic therapy whereby one overcomes the burdens of locality, of being constrained by any 
social or group identity. It is to accept and affirm the necessary tragedy that is one’s true natural existence. Diogenes 
would quote Euripides, saying all the ‘curses of tragedy’ had fallen upon his head, as he was ‘Without a city or home, 
bereft of his native land, a beggar, a wanderer living from day to day,’ and yet he felt ‘fully prepared to compete in 
happiness with the King of the Persians’ and ‘took no less pride in all of this than did Alexander in ruling over the 
world’ (Gnomologium Vaticanum 201; G263; Hard 2012: 12).  
 The chief virtues of negative Cynic cosmopolitanism are so many ways of embodying a total rejection of 
nomos: freedom (eleutheria), self-sufficiency (autarkeia), frank speech (parrhesia), shamelessness (anaideia), 
suffering (ponos), and exercise or discipline (askesis). The Cynic view of virtue is not so much as a capacity to activate 
a latent logos in tune with nature’s innate moral preferences, as with the Stoics, but more as a capacity for mental and 
physical strength, an ability to withstand the seductions of culture and civilization, the courage to live without normal 
human society. As Julie Piering writes, “Instead of training the body for the sake of victory in the Olympic Games, 
on the battlefield, or for general good health, the Cynic trains the body for the sake of the soul” (Piering 2006). For 
the Cynics, virtue is a matter of natural power, not a disposition to do what is right in any strict moral sense. Life is a 
confrontation, a test of endurance. The degree to which one could live without social norms and their assumed benefits 
expresses one’s amount of virtue. The Cynics regarded this negative, destructive, and borderline anarchic approach as 
a shortcut to virtue. It did not require a great education or much cultivation. In fact, it required a relatively 
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uncomplicated submersion into carefree destitution and detachment. For them, nothing was easier than to live a life 
of free and indifferent wandering, mostly bereft of possessions (Cynics famously owned only a staff and knapsack 
with a few lupins and scrolls, and slept in wine-jars and temples), and in perpetual confrontation with social norms. 
Diogenes would constantly berate people for their pretensions toward civility and openly violate the key taboos that 
are foundational for civilization. He would eat, sleep, fart, piss, shit, spit, fuck, and wank in public. Crates, Diogenes’ 
main follower, also had sex in public with his Cynic wife, Hipparchia. Diogenes openly supported sexual communism, 
incest, and cannibalism. Wanting to prove he did not need to cook his meat, noting that cooking was a key practice 
leading to civilization, he died by eating a raw octopus. He openly disdained the idea of obtaining a good reputation 
for anything resembling normative or normal behavior. Diogenes aimed to live as if he had returned to the Golden 
Age of Chronos (Martin 1997), a time when nature was in perpetual springtime and there was no culture, commerce, 
war, property, possessions, social identity, or class or ethnic or sexual divisions whatsoever to separate humans from 
their natural lives. Humans lived indistinguishably from nature and the gods in this pre-Promethean state, a kind of 
moral anti-realist pantheist view in contrast to later Stoic moral naturalist pantheism. Virtue, Diogenes thought, was 
quite accessible. All one had to do was have the courage to give up on the artifacts, norms, or desires that stem from 
culture and civilization, social identity, and group loyalty. With negative Cynic cosmopolitanism, individualism 
replaces communitarianism and naturalism replaces humanism. Humans qua humans are no longer special and neither 
are any of the bonds they form. What matters is the courage to live without artificial, conventional humanity. 
 Cynic cosmopolitanism has a positive side as well. Diogenes said ‘the only true state (politeia) was the whole 
universe (kosmos)’ (DL 6.72, trans. modified; Hicks 1925: 75). He was not only a citizen of nowhere in particular. He 
was a citizen of everywhere. For the Cynics, the universe itself is one’s home and fatherland. Crates is cited as having 
written tragic verses proclaiming that ‘my country has not one tower or roof, but is a citadel as wide as the whole 
earth, and is a home prepared for us all to dwell within’ (DL 6.98, trans. modified; Hicks 1925: 103). The Cynics took 
their actual homelessness to mean they resided everywhere. Their allegiance was to nature, which all entities could 
claim as their real homeland if they too performed the Cynic practice of austere, virtuous therapy. By being a citizen 
of the cosmos, the Cynic thought not only that everyone was essentially at home everywhere, but that everything 
belonged to everyone as well. Everyone has equal right to everything. This is why Diogenes saw no shame in begging. 
He was merely asking for what was already his, what was his due for living virtuously, in accordance with nature, 
which was his therapeutic gift to his fellow world-citizens. The Cynic sage resided in perfect communion with all 
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beings, especially the gods. As co-citizens of the cosmos, the wise and divine formed an absolute fraternal order to 
which all was owed because they made explicit the fact they, and indeed everyone, already possessed and shared 
everything. Diogenes had another nifty syllogism for this point: ‘Everything belongs to the gods; the wise are friends 
to the gods; friends hold all things in common; ergo, everything belongs to the wise’ (DL 6.37; G353; Hicks 1925: 
39). Thus we can begin to see how the destructiveness of negative Cynic cosmopolitanism is in service of a positive 
vision of world-citizenship. The Cynic annihilates the usual human distinctions in favor of a natural univocity. In the 
true state of nature, the universal cosmopolis, all are natural born citizens from the perspective of their essentially 
divine bestiality. Diogenes, the wise friend of nature’s inherent divinity, performs in his own person the natural truth 
that all are one as world-citizens. The job of the Cynic was just to help people realize this, to assist them in becoming 
what they are. This was the Cynics’ therapeutic goal, their philanthropia (Moles 1996: 116). They wanted to share 
with as many as possible the ease with which they could embody Cynic virtue. Indeed, Cynic virtue itself, the condition 
or state of being a Cynic, is the only true state (politeia). As Moles has argued, it is an ‘absolutely fundamental point’ 
that ‘the Cynic politeia, the Cynic ‘state,’ is nothing other than…the ‘state’ of being a Cynic’ (Moles 1996: 111). The 
Cynic state is the virtuous identification of one and all with and as the cosmos, the cosmopolis that is the universe. 
The Cynic is the cosmopolis because the Cynic is the nature with which it lives in accordance. Being a Cynic, Cynic 
virtue, the Cynic cosmos, the gods, the universe, and nature are all identical. They are all different ways of describing 
the same state.   
 To back up these claims and draw a starker contrast with Stoicism, the Cynic view of nature does not seem 
to have the moral teleology or providentialism or even patterned order one finds in the Stoics. Nature for the Cynics 
was, to use a contemporary metaphysical term, gunky (Lewis 1991: 20). An object is gunky if it is not composed of 
any atomic simples. Gunk is infinitely divisible. There is no part of gunk that is not composed of further parts. If 
nature is gunky, then every thing is an infinitely divisible part of nature. Also, everything, from the perspective of 
nature, is composed of everything else, as there is no principled way to distinguish which parts belong to any particular 
thing as opposed to another. Besides, if any one object could be properly distinguished, it would eventually be noted 
to include everything since each of its parts include all other parts. Indeed, any object itself is nothing but an infinitely 
divisible part of any other object and so on ad infinitum, all of which just are nature, the gunky whole that is each and 
every gunky part. A gunky nature is one where every part is a part of—that is, mixes and interpenetrates with—every 
other part, and ultimately is every other part. There is evidence for this when Diogenes is cited as having offered 
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Anaxagoras’ view of nature, which has been noted for its gunkiness (Sider 1993; Marmodoro 2015). Anaxagoras’ 
‘Everything-In-Everything Principle’ is found in fragments where he states ‘in everything there is a share of 
everything’ (DK B11) and ‘all things are mixed with everything’ (DK B1; Graham 210: 281-290; Curd 2015). 
Supposedly, in his version of the tragedy of Thyestes, Diogenes says ‘all elements are contained in all things and 
pervade all things’ (DL 6.73; Hicks 1925: 75). Also, the Cynics are reported to have abided by the common Presocratic 
principle that out of nothing comes nothing, which meant that all change is just nature composing, decomposing, and 
recomposing its infinitely divisible gunky parts endlessly (Martin 1997: 93). If the latent Cynic view of nature is as 
gunky, then the claim that the Cynic sage lives in accordance with nature means that he identifies with the gunk that 
he and all things are. The key thing here is that there is no evidence this gunk involves any natural moral law imbuing 
the universe with some sort of inherent reason or telos. Gunk is pointless chaos, a wonderful admixture of all with all. 
Moreover, the Cynic cosmopolis is gunky nature, and the Cynic cosmopolitan is a citizen of this gunky world. Such 
a view of nature allows Cynic therapy to work its magic with maximal ease. All one has to do is dissolve into their 
gunky essence through indifference and detachment. Cynic cosmopolitanism is a therapeutic cosmopolitanism that 
allows for the achievement of a kind of happiness and flourishing that is ultimately wild, delirious, absorptive, and 
anarchic. 
What is most fascinating about Cynic cosmopolitanism is that it short-circuits the definition of 
cosmopolitanism with which we started. A cosmopolis is supposed to be a supranational community based on some 
feature all humans share. Yet, for the Cynics, the true cosmopolis is not a universal human community, but nature 
itself. This is to say the Cynics would regard other forms of cosmopolitanism as still too parochial. Forming a 
supranational community based on shared human features, as if humans had some features that ultimately were not 
shared by all things, is merely to make humans the tribe and push the myopic localism up to a larger level. In other 
words, only a cosmopolitanism that drops humanism, and thus the communitarianism based on it, would be a true 
cosmopolitanism. To go truly cosmic, humans must be absorbed into nature and be regarded as merely so many more 
expressions of an absolutely gunky universe. The Cynic cosmopolis could only be called a community in the loosest 
(or perhaps strictest) sense of the term. It is a community of all beings with all beings based on the shared feature of 
naturalness, a community wherein all members are indistinguishable as gunky parts of a gunky universe. Cynicism 
thus exacerbates and explodes the universalism and communitarianism that is thought to define cosmopolitanism. If 
a cosmopolitanism is supposed to be universalist, then it should regard all things, not just humans, as essentially 
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identical with the whole universe. If a cosmopolitanism is supposed to be communitarian, then it should regard all 
things as members of a gunky community, a community of all with all. It is arbitrary, anthropocentric, and chauvinistic 
to have a cosmopolitanism based on merely human features like reason or moral value or a prospective world-state or 
legal rights or a global market place or cultural practices. All things, animate and inanimate, are citizens of the truly 
universal community that is the Cynic cosmopolis. Each infinitely divisible individual is the cosmos. Cynic 
cosmopolitanism is the equally negative and positive, destructive and creative, therapy whereby one becomes what 
one is: a true citizen of the world. Any other perspective on world-citizenship, a perspective concerned with universal 
humanism and supranational communitarianism, remains a viciously parochial and myopically tribal obfuscating 
localism.   
A final question: could one be a Cynic cosmopolitan today? On the one hand, the Cynic answer would be ‘of 
course!’ The Cynic lifestyle remains the quickest short-cut to virtue. Nothing is stopping anyone from dropping it all 
and adopting, or at least approximating, the Cynic lifestyle. On the other hand, one could claim that Cynicism is even 
more offensive and impossible today. Its seeming irrationalism, anti-humanism, and callousness might be more 
intolerable today than at any point in Western history. Obviously, it is most likely no one reading this (or writing it!) 
would ever actually live like an ancient Cynic. I would hazard we just have neither the desire nor the constitution for 
it. However, I would like to conclude by proposing that Cynic cosmopolitanism be treated as a possible perspective 
through which one could view contemporary politics and social life more generally. After all, it at least has the 
historical pedigree on its side of being the first well-formed cosmopolitan view. It deserves recognition for that. 
Cynicism might be helpful, perhaps therapeutically beneficial, today now that we appear to be living through another 
nationalist stage of history. The best response, the Cynic response, to the likes of Theresa May is twofold. One could, 
as stated, go negative and enjoy taking the view of being a citizen of nowhere, of not feeling or believing in the 
slightest that any one group or nation is worth more or less than any other most simply because local groups, however 
construed, do not matter from the absolute perspective of nature. One could also go positive and tell nationalists that 
one is a citizen of everywhere, the whole universe in the sense of recognizing all things, including nations, as so many 
ways nature natures (natura naturans, as Spinoza would say). To take a positive Cynic cosmopolitan perspective is to 
go extremely naturalist and view humans first as mere animals like any other and then as the mere globs of gunk that 
they and all things are. The liberation of extreme naturalism allows one to see the all-too-human pretense toward in-
group bias and cultural superiority as what it is: a pathetic gesture from a weak creature that likes to flatter itself 
 18 
beyond comprehension or justification. The Cynic cosmopolitan perspective, while anti-humanist, is also a view on 
humans that allows one to properly love and aim to cure them, for it treats them as they really are. No nationalist or 
traditional cosmopolitan view could provide a similarly effective therapy, an equally effective remedy for the 
pathologies of tribalism and nationalism. 
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